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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
Do the types of procedure affect the politicization of constitutional courts? 
We argue that they do and we find evidence that supports this assumption 
with regard to courts in three European democracies: Germany, Bulgaria and 
Portugal. These cases show that the lower the legal requirements on the part 
of the applicants, and the greater the opportunities for attacking political 
opponents within a particular type of procedure, the higher the level of 
politicization of the constitutional court decisions is. For quite some time, 
political scientists investigating constitutional courts have focused on 
political influences on constitutional review. These influences result from the 
position of constitutional courts on the interface between law and politics.1 
Moreover, they are likely to occur, since constitutional law is highly open to 
interpretation. In particular, when political actors handle interest-based 
conflicts before the constitutional court, political influences are virtually 
inevitable. However, political influences threaten the adjudicatory nature of 
constitutional adjudication.2 This may cause problems of legitimacy, 
especially if these influences call the judges' independence – and hence the 
rule of law – into question. 
                                                 
1 See Alec Stone Sweet, Governing with Judges. Constitutional Politics in Europe 
(OUP 2000). 
2 See Dieter Grimm, 'Constitutions, Constitutional Courts and Constitutional 
Interpretation at the Interface of Law and Politics' in Bogdan Iancu (ed), The 
Law/Politics Distinction in Contemporary Adjudication (Eleven International 2009), 21. 
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Against this background, many studies have analyzed the politicization of 
constitutional courts. By politicization we mean that a constitutional court 
decision is not – or not exclusively – taken based on legal criteria. Instead, it 
is (co-)determined by political influences, especially the judges' political party 
affiliations and their policy preferences. Moreover, these preferences can 
mirror ethical or religious beliefs or the judges' socio-cultural backgrounds.3 
The causes of politicization can be manifold: direct impacts on judges by 
political actors, the appointment of judges, the strategies and interests of the 
parties involved in constitutional disputes (including the judges themselves), 
and the judges' and the courts' understanding of their roles.  
 
It follows that political and legal culture, the content of the contested legal 
norms, public attention, and types of procedure exert moderating effects in the 
sense that these variables do not themselves cause politicization but modify 
its degree.4 These moderating factors thus 'channel' the political influences 
on constitutional adjudication. 
 
However, previous political science analyses have mainly focused on 
politicization with regard to the appointment of judges,5 the strategies and 
                                                 
3 See Michael Hein, Stefan Ewert, 'What is "Politicisation" of Constitutional Courts? 
Towards a Decision-oriented Concept' in Antonia Geisler, Michael Hein, Siri 
Hummel (eds), Law, Politics, and the Constitution. New Perspectives from Legal and 
Political Theory (Lang 2014), 31. 
4 See David P. MacKinnon, 'Integrating Mediators and Moderators in Research 
Design' (2011) Research on Social Work Practice 675, 678. 
5 Chris Hanretty, 'The Bulgarian Constitutional Court as an Additional Legislative 
Chamber' (2014) East European Politics and Societies, 540; Chris Hanretty, 'Dissent 
in Iberia: The ideal points of justices on the Spanish and Portuguese Constitutional 
Tribunals' (2012) European Journal of Political Research, 671; Nuno Garoupa, 
Marian Gili, Fernando Gómez-Pomar, 'Political Influence and Career Judges: An 
Empirical Analysis of Administrative Review by the Spanish Supreme Court' (2012) 
Journal of Empirical Legal Studies, 795; Royce Carroll, Lydia Tiede, 'Judicial 
Behavior on the Chilean Constitutional Tribunal' (2011) Journal of Empirical Legal 
Studies, 856; Nuno Garoupa, 'The Politicization of the Kelsenian Constitutional 
Courts: Empirical Evidence' in Kuo-Chang Huang (ed), Empirical Studies of Judicial 
Systems (Academia Sinica 2009), 149; Christoph Hönnige, 'The Electoral 
Connection. How the Pivotal Judge Affects Oppositional Success at European 
Constitutional Courts' (2009) West European Politics, 963. 
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interests of the parties involved,6 and political actors' attempts to directly 
control the courts.7 By contrast, studies of other factors are largely missing. 
This also holds true for types of procedure. They can be understood as 
regulating the access to constitutional courts, the possible contents of 
constitutional review, and the consequences of the court decisions.8 They thus 
define who may bring what kind of legal problems under which circumstances 
before the constitutional court, and which judicial consequences a judgment 
will have. Consequently, the types of procedure substantially configure the 
constitutional court's case law. Since politicization may impair the 
adjudicatory nature of constitutional review, the concrete configuration of 
the types of procedure is of vital importance for the legitimacy of a 
constitutional court. Procedures that potentially facilitate politicization play 
a rather problematic role. In contrast, procedures that potentially mitigate 
politicization would be preferable from a rule of law perspective. Therefore, 
substantial knowledge on how the types of procedure influence politicization 
is not only desirable for the scientific analysis of constitutional courts, but 
also for political and legal practitioners who deal with the establishment or 
reform of constitutional courts. 
 
Nevertheless, political science has very rarely taken different types of 
procedure into account so far, at least with regard to courts following the 
European model of concentrated judicial review. Silvia von Steinsdorff 
analyzes the types of procedure concerning the political consequences of 
court decisions in eight post-socialist constitutional courts in Central and 
                                                 
6 Hönnige (fn 5); Stone Sweet (fn 1); Georg Vanberg, 'Abstract Judicial Review, 
Legislative Bargaining, and Policy Compromise' (1998) Journal of Theoretical 
Politics, 299. 
7 Maria Popova, Politicized Justice in Emerging Democracies. A Study of Courts in Russia 
and Ukraine (CUP 2012); Pilar Domingo, 'Judicialization of Politics or Politicization 
of the Judiciary: Recent Trends in Latin America' (2004) Democratization, 104. 
8 See Victor Ferreres Comella, Constitutional Courts and Democratic Values. A European 
Perspective (Yale UP 2009), 5–8. Using this definition, we examine only the 
aforementioned three aspects of the constitutional courts' procedural rules. Other 
procedural elements such as the formation of panels, chambers, or senates, the rules 
regulating the intra-court negotiations, the execution of oral and/or written 
proceedings, and the voting rules within the court are left out of consideration. 
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Eastern Europe.9 Steven Schäller examines the impact that types of 
procedure have on the occurrence of prejudices in the decisions of the 
German Federal Constitutional Court.10 Apart from these examples, 
however, the relevant literature provides only a few scattered arguments on 
the impact certain types of procedure have,11 an overview of 'ancillary powers' 
of constitutional courts,12 and a descriptive typology of types of procedure.13 
Aside from those, many comparative political science studies focus only on 
selected types of procedure, most commonly abstract review procedures or 
disputes between state bodies.14 
                                                 
9 Silvia von Steinsdorff, 'Verfassungsgerichte als Demokratie-Versicherung? 
Ursachen und Grenzen der wachsenden Bedeutung juristischer Politikkontrolle' in 
Klemens H. Schrenk, Markus Soldner (eds), Die Analyse demokratischer 
Regierungssysteme. Festschrift für Wolfgang Ismayr zum 65. Geburtstag (VS Verlag für 
Sozialwissenschaften 2010), 479. 
10 Steven Schäller, 'Präjudizien als selbstreferenzielle Geltungsressource des 
Bundesverfassungsgerichts' in Hans Vorländer (ed) Die Deutungsmacht der 
Verfassungsgerichtsbarkeit (VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften 2006), 205. 
11 See e.g. Nuno Garoupa, Tom Ginsburg, 'Building Reputation in Constitutional 
Courts: Party and Judicial Politics' (2011) Arizona Journal of International and 
Comparative Law 539; Wojciech Sadurski, 'Rights-Based Constitutional Review in 
Central and Eastern Europe' in Tom Campbell, K. D. Ewing, Adam Tomkins (eds), 
Sceptical Essays on Human Rights (OUP 2001), 315; Helmut Simon, 
'Verfassungsgerichtsbarkeit' in Ernst Benda, Werner Maihofer, Hans-Jochen Vogel 
(eds), Handbuch des Verfassungsrechts der Bundesrepublik Deutschland (2nd edn, de 
Gruyter 1994), 1637. 
12 Tom Ginsburg, Zachary Elkins, 'Ancillary Powers of Constitutional Courts' (2009) 
Texas Law Review 1431; see also Tom Ginsburg, 'Ancillary Powers of Constitutional 
Courts' in Tom Ginsburg, Robert A. Kagan (eds), Institutions and Public Law: 
Comparative Approaches (Lang 2004), 225. 
13 Sascha Kneip, 'Verfassungsgerichtsbarkeit im Vergleich' in Oscar W. Gabriel, 
Sabine Kropp (eds), Die EU-Staaten im Vergleich. Strukturen, Prozesse, Politikinhalte 
(VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften 2008), 631, 643–647. 
14 See e.g. Sascha Kneip, 'Constitutional courts as democratic actors and promoters of 
the rule of law: institutional prerequisites and normative foundations', (2011) 
Zeitschrift für Vergleichende Politikwissenschaft 131; Hönnige (fn 5). Ali S. Masood, 
Donald R. Songer, 'Reevaluating the Implications of Decision-Making Models: The 
Role of Summary Decisions in U.S. Supreme Court Analysis' (2013) Journal of Law 
and Courts 363, level a similar critique with regard to the state of the art in U.S. 
Supreme Court studies, which mainly focus on the 'plenary decisions' but leave out 
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Therefore, this article examines whether and in what manner the different 
types of procedure influence the politicization of constitutional court 
decisions. As outlined above, we consider the types of procedure as a 
moderating variable that channels politicization: we assume that the level of 
politicization varies among different types of procedure. We conduct our 
analysis using a Most Different Systems Design. From all concentrated 
constitutional courts in European democracies as of 2010, we selected the 
German Bundesverfassungsgericht (Federal Constitutional Court), the 
Bulgarian Konstitucionnen săd (Constitutional Court) and the Portuguese 
Tribunal Constitucional (Constitutional Tribunal). We analyzed all decisions 
of these constitutional courts from 1991 to 2010 for Germany and Bulgaria, 
and from 2005 to 2010 for Portugal. On the basis of two theory-driven 
hypotheses, we divided all types of procedure into four groups, which we 
expect to have different levels of politicization. 
 
In the following, we first present our concept of politicization and discuss the 
challenges of distinguishing between politics and law (II.). We then proceed 
to develop our two hypotheses and describe the different types of procedure 
that can be found across European constitutional courts (III.). We then 
operationalize politicization (IV.) and explain our case selection (V.). 
Subsequently, we illustrate the empirical data and present our results (VI.). 
Finally, we interpret our results in the light of our hypotheses, discuss the 
validity of our findings beyond the countries analyzed, and provide an 
outlook on further research (VII.). 
 
II. THE CONCEPT OF POLITICIZATION 
 
'Politicization' is one of the most frequently used terms in scientific research 
on constitutional adjudication. It can be found in numerous studies that deal 
with political influences on constitutional courts and supreme courts (and 
also on lower-level ordinary courts) in practically all regions of the world.15 
                                                 
the 'summary decisions'. According to that analysis, this narrowing of perspective 
had created the widespread impression of a conservative court. 
15 Instead of others, see for the US Supreme Court: Benjamin Woodson, 
'Politicization and the Two Modes of Evaluating Judicial Decisions' (2015) Journal of 
Law and Courts 193; Brandon L. Bartels, Christopher D. Johnston, 'Political Justice. 
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Due to the tradition of conceptualizing judges as 'politicians in robes',16 i.e. 
as politically interested actors that do not systematically differ from other 
political actors, the concept played a rather minor role in US American 
political science for quite a long time. However, even there the concept of 
politicization has gained in importance in recent years.17 
 
In general, politicization describes the process of 'making previously non-
political persons or issues political', i.e. 'the expansion of politics, especially 
of the power to take socially binding decisions and to penetrate previously 
non-political fields such as private life or private economic activity'.18  
We assume that constitutional adjudication is basically a legal and not  
a political process. However, it is subject to political influences for at least 
two reasons. First, constitutions regularly contain politically controversial 
issues such as the normative foundations of the constitutional order or the 
                                                 
Perceptions of Politicization and Public Preferences Toward the Supreme Court 
Appointment Process' (2012) Public Opinion Quarterly 105; Stephen M. Engel, 
American Politicians Confront the Court. Opposition Politics and Changing Responses to 
Judicial Power (CUP 2011); for Latin America: Diana Kapiszewski, High Courts and 
Economic Governance in Argentina and Brazil (CUP 2012); Raul A. Sanchez Urribarri, 
'Politicization of the Latin American Judiciary via Informal Connections' in David 
K. Linnan (ed), Legitimacy, Legal Development and Change: Law and Modernization 
Reconsidered (Ashgate 2012), 307; Carroll and Tiede (fn 5); Domingo (fn 7); for 
Western Europe: Hönnige (fn 5); Stone Sweet (fn 1); Vanberg (fn 6); Nicos C. 
Alivizatos, 'Judges as Veto Players' in Herbert Döring (ed), Parliaments and Majority 
Rule in Western Europe (Campus 1995), 566; for post-socialist Central and Eastern 
Europe: Popova (fn 7); Michael Hein, 'Constitutional Conflicts between Politics and 
Law in Transition Societies: A Systems-Theoretical Approach' (2011) Studies of 
Transition States and Societies 3; for Asia: Jiunn-rong Yeh, Wen-Chen Chang (eds.), 
Asian Courts in Context (CUP 2014); Björn Dressel, 'Judicialization of Politics or 
Politicization of the Judiciary? Considerations from Recent Events in Thailand' 
(2010) The Pacific Review 671; and for Africa: Kierin O'Malley, 'The Constitutional 
Court' in Murray Faure, Jan-Erik Lane (eds), South Africa: Designing New Political 
Institutions (Sage 1996), 75. 
16 Charles H. Sheldon, The Supreme Court. Politicians in Robes (Glencoe Press 1970). 
17 See Woodson (fn 15); Bartels and Johnston (fn 15); Engel (fn 15); Garoupa (fn 5); Stone 
Sweet (fn 1); Vanberg (fn 6). 
18 Manfred G. Schmidt, 'Politisierung' in Manfred G. Schmidt (ed), Wörterbuch zur 
Politik (3rd ed, Kröner 2010), 630, 630. All German quotes were translated by the 
authors. 
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basic rules of the political process. In particular, when political actors handle 
interest-based conflicts before a court, political influences are virtually 
inevitable. 
  
Second, constitutional law is often quite general in its formulation and 
therefore highly open to interpretation. Admittedly, this openness differs 
depending on the kind of constitutional norm. For instance, rules are 
generally considered less disputable than standards – and these in turn are 
both deemed less disputable than principles.19 Nevertheless, even if 
'provisions are formulated as clearly and as coherently as possible, they can 
raise questions when it comes to solving a concrete case.'20 Therefore, 
constitutional judges frequently have a broad scope for decision-making and 
they do not necessarily need to base their decisions solely on legal criteria. 
Quite often, constitutional courts are even required to decide on matters for 
which they cannot find clear answers in the constitutional text. As Robert A. 
Dahl put it with regard to the US Supreme Court, 'it is an essential 
characteristic of the institution that from time to time its members decide 
cases where legal criteria are not in any realistic sense adequate to the task 
[…]; that is, the setting of the case is "political".'21 Therefore, the judges may 
be (and sometimes inevitably are) politically influenced, most notably by 
individual political party affiliations and policy preferences. These influences 
can also reflect ethical and religious ties, ideological beliefs, and the socio-
cultural backgrounds of the judges. 
 
                                                 
19 Instead of others see Pierre J. Schlag, 'Rules and Standards' (1985) UCLA Law 
Review 379. 
20 Grimm (fn 2), 27. A recent example of such an only seemingly clear case is a dispute 
before the Polish Constitutional Tribunal in 2011 concerning the meaning of Article 
98, paragraph 2 of the Polish Constitution, according to which parliamentary 
elections have to take place on 'a non-working day.' To improve their chances in the 
upcoming elections, the then governing coalition had tried to extend the ballot to 
two days. This seemingly unequivocal breach of the constitution caused one of the 
most controversial decisions of the Tribunal, in which no less than eleven (!) of the 15 
judges issued dissenting opinions. Judgment of the Polish Constitutional Tribunal, 
K 9/11, OTK ZU No. 61/6/A/2011. 
21 Robert A. Dahl, 'Decision-Making in a Democracy: The Supreme Court as a 
National Policy-Maker' (1957) Journal of Public Law 279, 280. 
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In sum, politicization of constitutional adjudication means that a court 
decision is not or not exclusively made on the basis of legal criteria, but is 
(co-)determined by political influences. Politicization thus refers to the 
instances in which judges either are (consciously or unconsciously) influenced 
in their search for the most convincing legal solution to the constitutional 
matter before them by their political preferences or considerations regarding 
political appropriateness, or even decide a case on the basis of political 
criteria and then prepare a legal reasoning to support this.22 
 
However, distinguishing between political and legal criteria is the main 
challenge in the study of politicization – both theoretically and empirically.23 
Theoretically, even precise definitions as provided e.g. by sociological 
systems theory24 are highly disputed. Empirically, it is impossible to identify 
political influences in single court decisions since the real motives of the 
judges cannot be discovered unequivocally. These difficulties 
notwithstanding, it seems reasonable to assume that if political influences did 
not play any role in the work of a court, there should be no long-term 
correlations between any causes of politicization and the court's 
adjudication. Under a number of restrictions, it is therefore possible to 
approach politicization by observing certain characteristics of constitutional 
court decisions such as the probability of success of oppositional claims25 or 
                                                 
22 For a more comprehensive discussion of this concept of politicization, see Hein, 
Ewert (fn 3). 
23 See Bogdan Iancu (ed), The Law/Politics Distinction in Contemporary Public Law 
Adjudication (Eleven International 2009); Robert C. Post, Neil S. Siegel, 'Theorizing 
the Law/Politics Distinction: Neutral Principles, Affirmative Action, and the 
Enduring Legacy of Paul Mishkin' (2007) California Law Review 1473. 
24 Instead of others see Niklas Luhmann, 'Operational Closure and Structural 
Coupling: The Differentiation of the Legal System' (1991) Cardozo Law Review 1419; 
Michael Hein, 'Constitutional Conflicts between Politics and Law in Transition 
Societies: A Systems-Theoretical Approach' (2011) Studies of Transition States and 
Societies 3. 
25 Martina Flick, Organstreitverfahren vor den Landesverfassungsgerichten. Eine 
politikwissenschaftliche Untersuchung (Lang 2011); Hönnige (fn 5). 
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the distribution of dissenting votes.26 Since the former would be restricted to 
a few types of procedure only, we have opted for the latter (see section IV.). 
 
III. TYPES OF PROCEDURE AS 'CHANNELS OF POLITICIZATION': 
TWO HYPOTHESES 
 
As mentioned in the introduction, the types of procedure regulate the access 
to constitutional courts, the possible contents of constitutional review, and the 
consequences of the court decisions. Access may be given to state bodies, 
natural and legal persons, organizations (e.g. political parties), and the 
constitutional court ex officio. The contents of constitutional adjudication are 
manifold (see table 1 below). The consequences of the decisions can be 
classified into three legal categories: non-binding, binding only for the parties 
involved in the proceedings (inter partes), or generally binding for the 
constitutional order in total (erga omnes). Additionally, the implementation of 
a decision in practice may differ substantially from the legal provisions, seeing 
as constitutional courts do not have their own executive capacities and are 
dependent on other state bodies' willingness to comply. 
 
1. Hypothesis 1: Legal Requirements 
Our first hypothesis refers mainly to the access to and the content of 
constitutional adjudication. It takes the legal requirements that the different 
types of procedure impose on the applicants into account. The hypothesis 
follows an argument that has been present in the literature for a long time, 
but has until now not been proven empirically. It goes back to Alexis de 
Tocqueville's seminal study on 'Democracy in America'. Tocqueville 
                                                 
26 See e.g. Chris Hanretty, 'Judicial Disagreement need not be Political: Dissent on the 
Estonian Supreme Court' (2015) Europe-Asia Studies 970; Hanretty, Court (fn 5); 
Hanretty, Dissent (fn 5); Susumu Shikano, Verena Mack, 'Judges' Behaviour and 
Relationship with Political Parties in a Non-Common-Law Country: the Case of the 
German Federal Constitutional Court' (2014) Working Paper, Graduate School of 
Decision Sciences, University of Konstanz <https://dx.doi.org/10.13140/2.1.370 
3.8088> accessed 10 December 2015; Santiago Basabe-Serrano, 'Judges without 
Robes and Judicial Voting in Contexts of Institutional Instability: The Case of 
Ecuador's Constitutional Court, 1999–2007' (2012) Journal of Latin American 
Studies 127; Daniel Smilov, The Hybridity of Constitutional Courts – Arbiters in the 
Absence of Rules (CAS 2009). 
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develops his argument based on the two characteristics of judicial power: the 
obligation to decide on individual cases and the requirement of a claim: 
 
As long, therefore, as the law is uncontested, the judicial authority is not 
called upon to discuss it, and it may exist without being perceived. […] If a 
judge in deciding a particular point destroys a general principle, by passing a 
judgement which tends to reject all the inferences from that principle, and 
consequently to annul it, he remains within the ordinary limits of his 
functions. But if he directly attacks a general principle without having a 
particular case in view, he leaves the circle in which all nations have agreed to 
confine his authority, […] he ceases to be a representative of the judicial 
power.27 
 
Also with regard to the US Supreme Court, John Stuart Mill reaffirmed this 
argument. Referring directly to Tocqueville, Mill stated that the Supreme 
Court  
 
decides only as much of the question at a time as is required by the case 
before it, and its decision, instead of being volunteered for political purposes, 
is drawn from it by the duty which it can not refuse to fulfill, of dispensing 
justice impartially between adverse litigants.28 
 
Transferred to modern constitutional adjudication, this means that types of 
procedure, such as the individual constitutional complaint or the concrete 
review, in most cases remain in the legal field since they are bound  
to individual legal disputes. Hence, these types of procedure should lead to  
a rather low level of politicization. By contrast, types of procedure such as the 
constitutional interpretation or the abstract review more likely protrude into 
the political sphere due to their lack of case specificity and thus function as 
channels for a comparatively high level of politicization. 
 
Recent research on constitutional courts has repeatedly been reconsidering 
this argument. As Nuno Garoupa and Tom Ginsburg put it: 'Whereas 
concrete review 'judicializes' constitutional courts, preventive review has the 
                                                 
27 Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America (Regnery 2002 [1835]), 74. 
28 John Stuart Mill, Considerations on Representative Government (Prometheus 1999 
[1861]), 327. 
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opposite effect. Preventive review makes a constitutional court  
less judicial and more political'.29 This argument can be generalized as 
follows: the likelihood that the decision-making process will be politicized 
depends on whether or not the applicant has to assert a violation of, or a 
threat to, their constitutional rights or competencies. If this is the case, the 
proceedings can only be opened in order to decide a concrete judicial dispute. 
In that context, the claimants' opportunities to pursue political interests are 
rather limited. Consequently, the judges' discretion is also clearly defined and 
limited. Thus, our first hypothesis regarding the legal requirements of the 
different types of procedure reads as follows: 
 
(H1) If a type of procedure does not require the claimant to assert a violation 
of or a threat to their constitutional rights or competencies, the 
politicization level will be higher than if the claimant does have to make such 
an assertion. 
 
2. Hypothesis 2: Political Opportunities 
Our second hypothesis considers the political opportunities of different 
types of procedure. Thus, it refers primarily to the consequences of  
the court's decision. Tocqueville already pointed out that constitutional 
judges are 'invested with immense political power'. Their power to examine 
the constitutionality of a law 'gives rise to immense political influence'.30 This 
influence can be exerted in line with or in contradiction to the interests of 
political actors. In contrast, those actors might try to use constitutional court 
proceedings for political goals, i.e. for purposes other than those intended by 
the constitution. Instead of the repeal of an unconstitutional situation, the 
settling of a legal dispute, or the protection of the constitutional order from 
its enemies, claimants might go to court primarily in order to reduce their 
political opponents' powers, to unseat political opponents, or even to 
eliminate them as political opponents. 
 
We assume that the different types of procedures channel these political 
intentions – the causes of politicization – in different ways. Types of 
                                                 
29 Garoupa, Ginsburg (fn 11), 550. See also Garoupa (fn 5), 158; Sadurski (fn 11), 318; 
Simon (fn 11), 1651. 
30 Tocqueville (fn 27), 75 f. 
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procedure that are commonly considered 'political' seem to be particularly 
suitable for these purposes, such as the removal from office, impeachment 
procedures, the party ban, or the dispute between state bodies. For instance, 
the failed impeachment proceedings against the previous Romanian 
President Traian Băsescu (2007 and 2012) showed a remarkably high degree 
of politicization.31 In particular, this became evident when the parliament 
initiated these procedures. The voting behavior of the deputies and senators 
ran almost exactly along party lines, even though on paper the procedure is 
not a political recall, as it deals with infringements of the constitution. 
Similarly, the presidential impeachment proceedings conducted in US 
history – in particular those of Andrew Johnson (1868) and Bill Clinton 
(1998/1999)32 – were heavily dominated by the conflicting political interests 
of the two 'blocs' in the Congress.33 Since in both countries only the 
parliament can initiate an impeachment procedure, it provides political 
actors with an opportunity to struggle for power by legal means, even though 
those means were designed to protect the constitution.34 In general, we 
assume for all above-mentioned 'political' types of procedure that there is a 
high probability of political interests being slipped in the cases and that this 
cannot be easily neutralized by the judges.35 
 
                                                 
31 Sergiu Gherghina, Sergiu Miscoiu, 'The Failure of Cohabitation: Explaining the 
2007 and 2012 Institutional Crises in Romania' (2013) East European Politics and 
Societies 668. 
32 Although the impeachment of Richard Nixon (1974) was also politicized, severe 
violations of the constitution and of the law played a much more important role in 
that case than in the other two. 
33 Arnold H. Leibowitz, An Historical-Legal Analysis of the Impeachments of 
Presidents Andrew Johnson, Richard Nixon, and William Clinton: why the Process 
Went Wrong (Mellen 2012). 
34 Upon completing this article, a similar pattern was observable with the ongoing 
impeachment of Brazil's president Dilma Rousseff, which had begun in late 2015; see 
'Brazil's Dilma Rousseff to face impeachment trial' (BBC News, 12 May 2016) 
<http://www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-america-36273916> accessed 19 May 2016. 
35 Admittedly, the US Supreme Court is only involved marginally in the procedure, and 
the parliament not only has the right to initiate but also to decide. Nevertheless, this 
case offers an illustration of the relevant logic: Even if the final decision would be 
made by the court (as in many other, particularly European, states), the problem of 
politicizing a legal matter would remain. 
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In contrast, types of procedure such as the constitutional interpretation,  
the actio popularis, the concrete review, or the individual constitutional 
complaint seem to be more 'judicial'. In these types of procedure, political 
opponents cannot directly be threatened in their position by the judgment. 
Therefore, it is much less likely that claimants try to transfer their political 
controversies to the constitutional court. Admittedly, decisions in these 
types of procedure can have indirect political consequences for political 
opponents (see the next subsection). Nevertheless, 'individual judges might 
be prone to political reasoning in a dispute between state bodies, while 
concrete review proceedings might evoke more legal reasoning.'36 
 
Again, we can generalize this argument for all types of procedure: Regarding 
the probability of a politicized decision by the constitutional court, the types 
of procedure have a moderating effect according to the opportunities they 
provide for the claimants to directly weaken the position of their political 
opponents. Thus, our second hypothesis regarding the political opportunities 
of the types of procedure reads as follows: 
 
(H2) If a type of procedure provides the opportunity to weaken political 
opponents directly, the politicization level will be higher than if such an 
opportunity is not provided. 
 
3. The Expected Degrees of Politicization of the Different Types of Procedure 
Combining both hypotheses, we can cross-tabulate all types of procedure 
requiring a claim.37 The types of procedure in field (a) meet both 
hypothesized conditions. Accordingly, we expect the highest level of 
politicization in this group. The fields (b) and (c) meet one of the conditions 
each. Thus, we expect a middle-range degree of politicization in these two 
                                                 
36 Uwe Kranenpohl, Hinter dem Schleier des Beratungsgeheimnisses. Der 
Willensbildungs- und Entscheidungsprozess des Bundesverfassungsgerichts (VS 
Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften 2010), 47. 
37 Ex-officio types of procedure are not included since there are no applicants whose 
legal requirements and political opportunities could be described according to the 
hypotheses. Non-judicial types of procedure such as the observation of elections and 
referendums and the confirmation of their results, or the registration of political 
parties (but not: appeals against their non-registration), are not included either, 
because they are supposed to be not politicized due to their formal character. 
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groups. However, while hypothesis 1 defines an absolute difference, 
hypothesis 2 defines only a relative distinction: The requirement to assert  
a violation of, or a threat to, one's constitutional rights or competencies (H1) 
exists or does not. Yet, while the possibility to weaken political opponents 
directly also exists only in certain types of procedure, it is almost always 
possible to weaken political opponents in an indirect fashion. This is 
particularly the case for the abstract review and the constitutional 
interpretation. These types of procedure are not only usable to decide 
conflicts of jurisdiction. In fact, the political opposition might restrict the 
legislative scope of the parliamentary majority by means of a successful 
lawsuit, thereby weakening the governing actors.  
 
In sum, we expect hypothesis 1 to have a stronger impact on politicization 
than hypothesis 2. Consequently, we assume a higher degree of politicization 
in group (b) than in group (c). Finally, the types of procedure in group (d) meet 
none of the conditions favoring politicization. Therefore, we expect the 
lowest degree of politicization here. Taken as a whole, we expect that the 
degrees of politicization will rank from high to low as follows: (a) → (b) → (c) → 
(d). Across the European constitutional courts we can find 15 different types 
of procedure requiring a claim.38 They are presented in table 1 and will be 
described in the following more closely.  
                                                 
38 See Allan R. Brewer-Carías (ed), Constitutional Courts as Positive Legislators. A Compa-
rative Law Study (CUP 2013); Ginsburg, Elkins (fn 12); Wojciech Sadurski, Rights 
Before Courts. A Study of Constitutional Courts in Postcommunist States of Central and 
Eastern Europe (2nd edn, Springer 2008); Ginsburg (fn 12); Georg Brunner, 'Der 
Zugang des Einzelnen zur Verfassungsgerichtsbarkeit im europäischen Raum' 
(2002) Jahrbuch des öffentlichen Rechts der Gegenwart 191. 
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Table 1: Expected degrees of politicization through types of procedure 
 
 Legal Requirements 
no violation of/threat to 
applicant's constitutional 
rights or competencies 
necessary 
violation of/threat to 
applicant's constitutional rights 
or competencies necessary 
P
olitical O
pportunities 
direct 
weakening of 
political 
opponents 
possible 
a: high 
• ban or non-registration 
of a political party 
• ban or non-registration 
of an organization 
• removal from office/ 
impeachment/ 
withdrawal of a 
parliamentary mandate 
due to offenses against 
criminal or 
constitutional law 
• appeals against the 
financial audit of 
political parties or 
election campaigns 
• forfeiture of basic 
rights 
c: medium-low 
• dispute between state 
bodies  
• scrutiny of 
elections/withdrawal of 
a parliamentary mandate 
due to offenses against 
the election law 
• appeals against elections 
to or deliberations of 
the governing bodies of 
political parties 
direct 
weakening of 
political 
opponents 
impossible 
b: medium-high 
• constitutional 
interpretation 
• abstract review 
• actio popularis 
• (quasi-actio popularis) 
d: low 
• concrete review 
• individual constitutional 
complaint 
• (quasi-actio popularis) 
Source: Authors' own compilation. 
a. Applicant's Constitutional Rights or Competencies Not Affected/Direct 
Weakening of Political Opponents Possible:  
We expect the highest degree of politicization in group (a). This group 
consists of procedures where the claimants do not have to assert a violation 
of, or a threat to, their own constitutional rights. However, these types of 
procedure are very appropriate as tools in political disputes. The threat to 
apply them alone can be used to weaken political opponents. Moreover, 
instead of clear statutory violations, constitutional judges mostly only have to 
2016} Politicization of European Constitutional Courts 78 
identify an abstract 'unconstitutional behavior'. Thus, a decision based on 
judicial criteria alone is often impossible. Instead, the judges are left with a 
large scope for interpretation that is susceptible to political influences.39 A 
special case in this group is the uncommon type of procedure 'financial audit 
of political parties and election campaigns'. This type of procedure can be 
found in Portugal, where the constitutional court ex officio reviews the 
finances of parties and election campaigns, and the parties involved can 
appeal against these decisions. The latter procedure is part of our empirical 
analysis, since our hypotheses are applicable here. 
 
b. Applicant's Constitutional Rights or Competencies Not Affected/Direct 
Weakening of Political Opponents Impossible:  
We expect a medium-high degree of politicization for the constitutional 
interpretation, the abstract review, the actio popularis, and – under specific 
conditions – what some scholars call the 'quasi-actio popularis'.40 The 
constitutional interpretation is a peculiarity of some post-socialist 
constitutional courts. In this type of procedure, state authorities are entitled 
to request the interpretation of any constitutional norm without any specific 
prerequisite. On the one hand, several post-socialist constitutions 
introduced this type of procedure with regard to the legal uncertainty during 
the transition to democracy and the rule of law. On the other hand, its 
potential politicization contradicts the intention of this type of procedure, 
because no concrete legal dispute is required. Additionally, the court can be 
forced to work legislatively and to declare one possible elaboration of a 
constitutional norm as the only possible option.  
 
The abstract review is a common type of procedure among almost all 
concentrated constitutional courts. Apart from obligatory (ex officio) abstract 
                                                 
39 Another question is, whether these types of procedure are functional and 
(normatively) desirable in a democratic constitutional state; see Gur Bligh, 
'Defending Democracy: A New Understanding of the Party Banning Phenomenon' 
(2013) Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law 1321; Peter Niesen, 'Anti-Extremism, 
Negative Republicanism, Civic Society: Three Paradigms for Banning Political 
Parties. Parts I and II' (2002) 3(7) German Law Journal <http://www.german 
lawjournal.com/volume-03-no-07> accessed 19 May 2016. 
40 Brunner (fn 38), 230. 
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review, there are two forms requiring a claim: preventive (a priori) and 
repressive (a posteriori) review. In both cases, only state bodies can initiate the 
procedure. The court then has to decide on the constitutionality of an act (be 
it an ordinance, a law or even a constitutional amendment) or an international 
treaty. We expect a medium-high degree of politicization since the 
claimant's constitutional rights or competencies do not have to be affected. 
Instead of an application of legal norms to concrete circumstances, the court 
is forced to review the challenged provision in an abstract manner. Moreover, 
typically the parliamentary opposition (or affiliated actors) bring politically 
controversial acts before the court. Hence, as the former German 
constitutional judge Helmut Simon pointed out, it is 
 
sometimes difficult to see, who actually needs help. The parties primarily 
reiterate their positions from the legislative process and continue their 
dispute before the court. The court easily takes on the role of arbitrator 
between opposing value judgments and prognoses, without being better 
equipped or qualified for this purpose than the parliament.41 
 
Government and opposition simply continue their controversy before the 
constitutional court. Thus, it seems obvious that the claimants in such 
abstract review procedures are mainly politically motivated.42 
 
The actio popularis is a special type of abstract review where everybody (or at 
least every citizen of the respective country) can assert the 
unconstitutionality of a legal norm without being affected personally. The so-
called 'quasi-actio popularis' differs from the genuine actio popularis insofar as 
this type of procedure imposes certain legal requirements on the applicant, 
in particular a substantiated 'legal interest'. 
  
                                                 
41 Simon (fn 11), 1651. 
42 See Klaus Stüwe, Die Opposition im Bundestag und das Bundesverfassungsgericht. 
Das verfassungsgerichtliche Verfahren als Kontrollinstrument der parlamenta-
rischen Minderheit (Nomos 1997), 183. Nevertheless, it is again another question 
whether the abstract review is a functional and (normatively) desirable type of 
procedure; see ibid, 180. 
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c. Applicant's Constitutional Rights or Competencies Affected/Direct Weakening of 
Political Opponents Possible: 
This group consists of three rather different types of procedure: the dispute 
between state bodies, the scrutiny of elections including the withdrawal of a 
parliamentary mandate due to offenses against the election law, and appeals 
against elections or deliberations of the governing bodies of political parties. 
The last mentioned type of procedure only applies to the Portuguese case. 
We expect a medium-low degree of politicization in this group, but lower 
than in group (b). On the one hand, claimants can initiate these procedures 
only if they assert a violation of, or threat to, their constitutional rights or 
competencies. On the other hand, the proceedings can be used primarily to 
negatively affect political opponents, e.g. to weaken other political parties or 
rivals within one's own party.43 Even if the constitutional judges have distinct 
judicial criteria for their decision in such cases, they often become entangled 
in these political controversies and can hardly escape their dynamics. 
 
d. Applicant's Constitutional Rights or Competencies Affected/Direct Weakening of 
Political Opponents Impossible: 
Finally, we expect the lowest degree of politicization for the types of 
procedure that meet none of the two conditions favoring politicization. This 
applies to the concrete review, the individual constitutional complaint and – 
under certain circumstances – the 'quasi-actio popularis'. Depending on its 
particular configuration, the latter procedure could belong to group (d) 
instead of group (b) (see above). This is the case if the legal requirements are 
shaped in such a manner that the applicant (at least de facto) has to be affected 
in their constitutional rights or competencies. Thus, the judges have to 
decide particular judicial disputes in these types of procedure. Therefore, 
they are 
 
triggered by the application of the disputed legal provisions to concrete 
circumstances and thus require the claimant to have been impaired in his 
own rights. Such a review, which can take into account the effect and scope 
of the provisions in legal reality, most closely corresponds to the function of 
a court.44 
                                                 
43 See ibid., 170 
44 Simon (fn 11), 1651. 
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Generally, it can be assumed that judicial interests motivate the claimants in 
these types of procedure,45 not least since 'political' state bodies usually do 
not have the right of petition here. Furthermore, the constitutional court 
decides within a clearly defined legal frame due to the case specificity. 
 
IV. THE OPERATIONALIZATION OF POLITICIZATION 
 
As outlined in section II, we use the judges' published dissenting opinions to 
analyze political influences on the court empirically. The majority of 
European constitutional courts enable the judges to publish their individual 
dissenting votes and/or the voting result nowadays.46 Hence, each judge is 
allowed to take a position that differs from the judges' majority publicly 
visible.47 Of course, the reasons for such a divergence can be manifold. 
Nevertheless, a political motivation or (unconscious) orientation is a likely 
reason for many cases:  
 
The practice of allowing dissent in constitutional courts signals that they are 
not entirely judicial but at least partly political in character. Allowing 
separate opinions and dispensing with unanimous voting sends a costly 
signal, because it means the ideologically important goal of having a single 
correct answer is being sacrificed. Consensus in a constitutional court thus 
expresses 'legal' decision-making rather than 'political' decision-making.48 
 
Even if dissent naturally appears in all collegiate courts, the majority of 
European legal systems permit their publication only for constitutional 
courts.49 Some states such as France or Italy even prohibit the publication of 
dissenting opinions for their constitutional judges. In these countries,  
                                                 
45 See Stüwe (fn 42), 197. 
46 Katalin Kelemen, 'Dissenting Opinions in Constitutional Courts' (2013) German 
Law Journal 1345. 
47 Apart from dissenting opinions, judges are also often allowed to publish concurring 
opinions. Here, the judge agrees with the decision, but not with the legal reasoning of 
the judges' majority. Therefore, concurring opinions usually do not indicate political 
influences. 
48 Garoupa, Ginsburg (fn 11), 547. 
49 See Kelemen (fn 46), 1346. 
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practitioners have argued that dissenting opinions, by demonstrating that 
judicial outcomes are not automatic, create the perception that judicial 
decisions are motivated by […] political considerations rather than […] legal 
or jurisprudential considerations, thereby undermining judicial 
independence.50 
 
Thus, dissenting opinions can indicate the partly political character of 
constitutional adjudication. For our measurement, we calculate the dissenting 
ratio (DR) as the share of publicly dissenting judges among all judges taking 
part in the decision. The DR theoretically ranges from 0.0 to 1.0. Cases with 
a DR > 0.5 may occur when an absolute or qualified majority of all judges is 
required or when more than half of the participating judges express 
dissenting opinions, but related to different aspects of the decision.51 We 
calculate the DR mean for each type of procedure and for each of the groups 
(a) to (d) in order to be able to describe differences in politicization. Using a 
relative measurement prevents a bias that might result from the absence of 
certain judges. In addition, it makes a comparison of different constitutional 
courts and especially the identification of consensus-orientated and conflict-
orientated courts possible. However, a direct comparison of the DR values of 
different courts is not valid in our study design, as we cannot consider all 
                                                 
50 Hanretty, Dissent (fn 5), 671. 
51 One example for the first scenario is the decision of the German Federal 
Constitutional Court concerning the ban of the National Democratic Party in 2003 
(BVerfGE 107, 339). In this case, a 3-to-4 minority of the seven judges on the bench 
decided against the motion (DR=0.57) since for a party ban a two-thirds majority of 
all eight judges (= 6; one judge was missing) is required. Concerning the second 
scenario, there are three extreme cases in Bulgaria during the period under 
investigation (Decisions No. 9/1994, 4/1995 and 10/1997; all decisions of the 
Bulgarian Constitutional Court are available at <http://constcourt.bg/acts> accessed 
19 May 2016). In these cases, there had been majorities for every part of the decision, 
but not a single judge agreed on the complete judgment. As a result, the DR reached 
the maximum value of DR=1.0. In Portugal, we have also observed some judgments 
with very high DR values in the framework of the second scenario (Judgments No. 
423/2008 with DR=0.769, and Judgment No. 338/2010 with DR= 0.833; all decisions 
of the Portuguese Constitutional Tribunal are available at <http://www.tribunal 
constitucional.pt/tc/acordaos> accessed 19 May 2016). All mentioned decisions in 
Bulgaria and Portugal were taken in abstract review procedures. 
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different causes and moderators of politicization. Nevertheless, the direction 
of the effect of the types of procedure should be similar in very different 
settings. Thus, we provide an indirect comparison: We compare the ranks of 
the types of procedure and of the different groups concerning the dissenting 
ratio. If, for example, the concrete review procedures in all countries have a 
distinctly lower DR than the abstract review procedures, this would clearly 
indicate a systematic relation – i.e. a higher degree of politicization of the 
latter type of procedure. 
 
However, as Chris Hanretty has recently shown for the Estonian Supreme 
Court, 'judicial disagreement need not to be political'.52 Instead, there is one 
crucial empirical precondition and one methodological limitation for using 
the dissenting opinions in order to analyze the moderating effects of the 
types of procedure. Empirically, the validity of the indicator DR is given only 
in cases for which it correlates with the main causes of politicization. With 
regard to the appointment of judges, previous studies have shown that in 
Germany,53 Bulgaria,54 and Portugal55 the decision-making behavior of the 
judges indeed correlates with their individual party affiliations and the 
positions of the political parties that appointed them.56 
 
To test the validity of our indicator, we furthermore examined the relation 
between different applicants and the dissenting ratio. Concerning the 
                                                 
52 Hanretty (fn 26), 970. 
53 Shikano, Mack (fn 26); Hönnige (fn 5). 
54 Hanretty, Court (fn 5); Smilov (fn 26). 
55 Hanretty, Dissent (fn 5); Pedro C. Magalhães, 'The Limits to Judicialization: 
Legislative Politics and Constitutional Review in the Iberian Democracies' (DPhil 
thesis, Ohio State University 2003) <http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc_num=o 
su1046117531> accessed 19 May 2016. 
56 Against the background of this knowledge, including these variables in our dataset 
would not only have been an unreasonably tremendous task of information 
procurement and coding. In fact, it would have been impossible for more than 99 
percent of the decisions of the German Federal Constitutional Court, since they 
were not taken by one of the two senates (consisting of eight judges each), but by one 
of the smaller six chambers (three judges). The chambers' decisions are not 
publicized but only accessible through the official court statistics, which do not 
provide information on the individual judges' behavior. 
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strategies and interests of the parties involved in constitutional disputes, one 
would expect a high degree of politicization with parliamentary claims 
because in most cases they are lodged by the opposition following (or 
expecting) political defeats against the governing majority. In contrast, 
lawsuits initiated by ordinary courts, prosecutors, or natural and legal persons 
should have a rather low level of politicization, since these actors normally do 
not primarily pursue political goals when going to the constitutional court. In 
the cases of Germany, Bulgaria, and Portugal the dissenting ratios fulfill the 
outlined expectations. According to our dataset, constitutional court 
decisions initiated by the parliaments show noticeably higher dissenting 
ratios than judgments stemming from ordinary courts, prosecutors, or 
natural and legal persons (see table 2).57 In sum, we can assume the outlined 
empirical precondition for using the dissenting ratio as measurement for 
politicization to be fulfilled in the three countries under investigation. 
 
Table 2: Comparison of the dissenting ratios of the different types of claimants 
 
 Germany Bulgaria Portugal 
parliament 0.1002 [46] 
(0.185) 
0.171 [181] 
(0.209) 
0.215 [13] 
(0.257) 
prosecutors n.e. 0.147 [62] 
(0.155) 
0.050 [453] 
(0.119) 
courts 0.0157 [333] 
(0.064) 
0.130 [23] 
(0.143) 
n.e. 
natural and legal 
persons 
0.0002 [96,093] 
(0.007) 
n.e. 0.014 [3,137] 
(0.065) 
Source: Authors' own compilation. Means of the claimants, number of cases per 
claimant [in square brackets], standard deviation (in brackets). N.e. = not eligible to 
apply. 
 
                                                 
57 The standard deviation (in brackets) shows that the variability of the DR is rather 
low in most of the different groups of applicants. The relatively small differences 
between the applicants in Bulgaria can be explained by the fact that the appointment 
of the General Prosecutor as well as the judges at the Supreme Court of Cassation 
and the Supreme Administrative Court (the judicial institutions that are eligible to 
apply before the constitutional court) is heavily influenced by the parliament. 
Therefore, the 'highest magistrates' are not as politically independent as their 
German and Portuguese counterparts. 
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The second condition is a methodological limitation. As mentioned in section 
II, the dissenting ratio – or any other measuring instrument one might use – 
cannot measure the extent of politicization in individual cases, but only 
reflect the differences in the degrees of politicization in long-term observations. In a 
single constitutional court decision, politicization can never be proven 
beyond doubt. It is simply not possible to discover the judges' real motives 
(whatever the contents of the judgment and the dissenting opinions might 
be). Even in cases where politicization seems obvious, the possibility remains 
that the distribution of votes only accidentally complies with the expected 
degree of politicization according to the composition of the bench.58 
 
In contrast, the court's caseload as such does not restrict the validity of the 
indicator with regard to our research question. Of course, a high caseload 
leads ceteris paribus to a lower percentage of published dissenting opinions (see 
below). The more cases judges have to deal with, the less time they have to 
formulate dissenting opinions. Yet, there is no reason to assume that the 
caseload has an impact on the distribution of the dissenting opinions across 
the different types of procedure. Instead, an equal distribution would just 
prove the null hypothesis, that is, show that the types of procedure do not 
modify the politicization of constitutional court decisions. 
 
Nevertheless, there might be a distorting effect on our measurement 
stemming from 'follow-up' or 'photocopy' judgments. If a court has once 
decided on a key matter (e.g. the interpretation of a certain constitutional 
provision), all cases coming before that court relating to this matter later on 
will be decided in line with the initial judgment (as long as the court does not 
change its view).59 If the precedent decision was accompanied by dissenting 
opinions, and the dissenting judges also take part in the follow-up judgments, 
two (mutually non-exclusive) possibilities exist: Either these judges repeat 
their dissents, or they 'give up' and bow to the majority's opinion. Either of 
                                                 
58 Martin Höpner, 'Warum betreibt der Europäische Gerichtshof Rechtsfortbildung? 
Die Politisierungshypothese' (2010) Sozialer Fortschritt 141, 144. 
59 German legal scholars therefore speak of 'lines of adjudication' ('Linien der 
Rechtsprechung'); see Hartmut Rensen, Stefan Brink (eds), Linien der Rechtsprechung 
des Bundesverfassungsgerichts – erörtert von den wissenschaftlichen Mitarbeitern (De 
Gruyter 2009). 
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those possibilities might distort the measurement of politicization. If dissent 
is repeated in a different type of procedure, one might say that this repeated 
dissent should not be counted since in this unique constellation, the latter type of 
procedure is obviously not moderating the degree of politicization. If judges 
keep their dissenting opinion but do not repeat it publicly, while the type of 
procedure remains the same, one might contrarily say that this covert dissent 
should be counted because causes and moderators of politicization recur as well. 
 
However, the information necessary for coding the data as outlined is either 
not accessible at all or only available by means of a thorough content analysis 
of all court decisions. Nevertheless, we can control for the possible distortion 
of the follow-up judgments on the dissenting behavior by selecting cases with 
different caseloads. A problematic effect of the follow-up judgments can only 
be relevant in courts with high caseload since in case of low caseload, the 
number of such judgments will also be quite low. If we find our hypothesized 
dissent pattern according to the types of procedure in cases with low, 
medium, and high caseloads, we can therefore reasonably interpret the 
differences in the dissenting ratio per type of procedure as differences in the 
degree of politicization. 
 
V. RESEARCH DESIGN AND CASE SELECTION 
 
In order to answer our research question we use a Most Different Systems 
Design. As is common in this kind of research, we use simple comparisons of 
the means to analyze the relationship between the types of procedure as 
moderating variables and politicization.60 Our complete61 survey of all court 
decisions during the 20 (Bulgaria and Germany) and six years (Portugal) under 
                                                 
60 For the methodological concept of a moderating variable, see MacKinnon (fn 4). 
Typical examples for means comparisons in constitutional court research can be 
found among others in Lawrence Baum, 'Linking Issues to Ideology in the Supreme 
Court. The Takings Clause' (2013) Journal of Law and Courts 89; Masood, Songer (fn 
14) and Schäller (fn 10). 
61 Excluded from the survey are only decisions in non-judicial and ex officio types of 
procedure (see n 37), procedural decisions (like on challenges of a judge for the fear 
of bias), and corrections of previous decisions. 
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investigation allows for valid empirical conclusions on the relationship of 
types of procedure and the probability of dissenting opinions.  
 
We selected our cases from the universe of a total of 19 concentrated 
constitutional courts in democratic territorial states in Europe as of 2010.62 
The period under our investigation is 1991 to 2010, in order to be able to 
include post-socialist countries and their specific paths of transition. We 
excluded hybrid regimes and autocracies, since the judges' autonomy of 
decision has to be regarded as limited in these states. Finally, we included only 
courts that allow the publication of dissenting opinions during the whole 
period under investigation. Following the logic of the Most Different 
Systems Design, we selected three courts according to the following three 
criteria: 
 
1. The courts should represent different European regions in order to 
vary possible historical, political-cultural and legal-cultural influences.  
2. The countries should be of different ages concerning democracy, the 
rule of law, and the constitutional courts, since we expect a strong 
influence of these ages both on the judges' and courts' understanding 
of their roles, and the contents of the claims. 
3. The caseload should vary distinctly in order to validate the 
operationalization of politicization and to confirm our assumption 
that even courts with high caseloads show an unequal DR distribution 
among the different types of procedure. 
 
Additionally, the selected courts should represent as many different types of 
procedure as possible, at least one of each group (a) to (d).  
 
As a result of applying these criteria, we selected the German Federal 
Constitutional Court, the Bulgarian Constitutional Court, and the 
Portuguese Constitutional Tribunal for our study. The German court has a 
very high caseload and is one of the oldest constitutional courts among the 
consolidated democracies of Central Europe. Bulgaria represents the case 
                                                 
62 All countries measured as 'free' according to the Freedom House Index; 'Freedom in 
the World 2011' (Freedom House) <https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-
world/freedom-world-2011> accessed 9 February 2015. 
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most different from Germany with a young court in a consolidating post-
socialist democracy in Eastern Europe with an exceptionally low caseload. 
Very different from these two cases according to all above-mentioned 
selection criteria is Portugal, which represents another group of 
constitutional courts: The Constitutional Tribunal has a median caseload 
and is a middle-aged court in a consolidated, but younger democracy in 
Southern Europe. However, we had to reduce the period under investigation 
in this case to the years 2005–2010. Portugal reformed the appointment of 
judges and several types of procedure in 1998 and again in 2004/05.63 
Therefore, aggregating and comparing the DR before 2004 is impossible. 
This is especially true for the financial audit of political parties and election 
campaigns since the rules of this type of procedure were changed 
substantially. Nevertheless, the number of cases in the period shortened to 
the six years from 2005 to 2010 (altogether 3,858 decisions) still allows for the 
inclusion of the Portuguese case in our study.  
 
Table 3 lists the types of procedure common to the three constitutional 
courts under investigation. However, two of these types of procedure have 
not been applied in the analyzed period (ban or non-registration  
of an organization, and removal from office/impeachment/withdrawal of  
a parliamentary mandate due to offenses against criminal or constitutional 
law). Hence, we analyzed ten different types of procedure from all the four 
groups (a) to (d). With regard to the concrete review, some explanatory 
remarks seem necessary here since this type of procedure is shaped quite 
differently in the three countries: While in Germany every ordinary court can 
refer any question of constitutionality of a certain legal norm to the 
constitutional court, only the two highest ordinary courts are allowed to do 
so in Bulgaria. In Portugal, traditionally every court can adjudicate a legal 
norm as unconstitutional, but only with inter partes effect for the case at hand. 
After the rejection of a complaint against such a decision, the parties to the 
dispute as well as the prosecution office can raise an objection before the 
Constitutional Tribunal. Hence, unlike in the other two countries, concrete 
                                                 
63 'Brief History of the Constitutional Court' (Portuguese Constitutional Court) 
<http://www.tribunalconstitucional.pt/tc/en/tribunal-historiaen.html> accessed 14 
July 2015; see also Joaquim de Sousa Ribeiro, Esperança Mealha, 'Portugal' in Brewer-
Carías (fn 38), 721. 
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review procedures take the lion's share in Portugal (2005–2010: 3.412 
cases/93.2 percent). However, the first-instance judgments of the 
Constitutional Tribunal also run inter partes only. Only if the Tribunal 
declared a norm unconstitutional in at least three cases, the prosecution 
office or a constitutional judge can initiate an abstract review in order to 
reject it with erga omnes effect.64 These procedures thus somewhat mix 
elements from abstract and concrete review. Therefore, although we coded 
them as concrete review procedures in a first step, we consider them in detail 
later on (see below). 
 
Table 3: Types of procedure at the constitutional courts in Germany, Bulgaria (both 
1991–2010) and Portugal (2005–2010)  
 
Types of procedure Courts 
group Individual GER BG PT 
a 
ban or non-registration of a political party x x (x) 
ban or non-registration of an organization  (x) (x) 
removal from 
office/impeachment/withdrawal of a 
parliamentary mandate due to offenses 
against criminal or constitutional law 
(x) (x) (x) 
appeals against the financial audit of political 
parties or election campaigns   x 
forfeiture of basic rights x   
b 
constitutional interpretation  x  
abstract review x x x 
actio popularis    
(quasi-actio popularis)    
c 
dispute between state bodies x x  
scrutiny of elections/withdrawal of a 
parliamentary mandate due to offenses 
against the election law 
x x x 
appeals against elections or deliberations of 
the governing bodies of political parties   x 
d 
concrete review x x x 
individual constitutional complaint x   
(quasi-actio popularis)    
Source: Authors' own compilation. Types of procedure in brackets were not applied 
during the period under investigation. 
                                                 
64 See ibid, 728. 
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VI. DATA AND RESULTS 
 
1. Caseload and Dissenting Ratio 
As mentioned in the previous section, the caseload of the three courts varies 
substantially. While the German Federal Constitutional Court took 96,853 
decisions in 1991–2010 (mean 4,843 per year), of which 96,614 are included in 
our analysis, the Bulgarian Constitutional Court issued only 297 judgments in 
the same period (15 on average per year), of which 289 are usable for testing 
our hypotheses. The Portuguese Constitutional Tribunal holds a median 
position with 3,858 decisions in the period under investigation (2005–2010, 
mean 643 per year). We included 3,659 of these decisions in our analysis.65 As 
we assumed, the caseload is inversely proportional to the share of published 
dissenting opinions. In Germany, the dissenting ratio is only 0.00032 for the 
whole period of analysis, but 0.15838 in Bulgaria and – again on a median 
position – 0.02159 in Portugal. However, there is no correlation between 
caseload and dissenting ratio over time, i.e., in all three countries, increasing 
numbers of decisions do not lead to decreasing dissenting ratios (and vice 
versa).66 
 
Even if these figures do not reflect the different reasons for politicization and 
the contextual (moderating) factors, they seem to confirm the general 
knowledge of the respective courts. The German Federal Constitutional 
Court is generally acknowledged as highly consensus-oriented,67 while the 
Bulgarian Constitutional Court is widely seen as characterized by strong and 
public conflicts.68 The Portuguese Constitutional Tribunal appears again as a 
median case. Although it features a party political polarization, it has 
                                                 
65 For the reasons of exclusion of decisions, see n 61. However, the decisions we did not 
analyze remain relevant with regard to the caseload. When different types of 
procedure and/or different types of applicants are present in one court decision, this 
decision and its DR appears several times in our dataset – one data point for each 
type of procedure and each type of applicant. 
66 Decisions per year/DR; Germany: Pearsons r=0.109/Significance t=0.649; Bulgaria: 
r=-0.023/t=0.923; [Portugal: r=0.117/t=0.825]). 
67 See Donald P. Kommers, Russel A. Miller, The Constitutional Jurisprudence of the 
Federal Republic of Germany (3rd edn, Duke UP 2012), 65 f. 
68 See Smilov (fn 26). 
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developed a noticeable consensus-orientation among the judges since the 
mid-1990s.69 
 
2. The Degrees of Politicization of Different Types of Procedure 
Table 4 shows the means of the four groups of the three constitutional courts' 
types of procedure. Even if the number of observations varies substantially 
between the different types of procedure and the countries (in square 
brackets in table 4)70, the dissenting ratios – interpreted as an indicator for 
different degrees of politicization – differ as hypothesized in our theoretical 
assumptions in the cases of Germany and Bulgaria.  Procedures of group (a), 
which allow for a direct weakening of political opponents and do not oblige 
the applicant to assert a violation of or threat to their constitutional rights or 
competencies, feature the highest degree of politicization in both countries. 
Types of procedure of groups (b) and (c), which fulfill only one condition of 
our hypotheses each, have a medium DR, with distinctly higher scores for 
group (b). The types of procedure of group (d), which do not allow for a direct 
weakening of political opponents and oblige the applicant to assert  
a violation of or a threat to their constitutional rights or competencies, 
feature the lowest degree of politicization. 
 
  
                                                 
69 See Magalhães (fn 55), 295. 
70 The standard deviation (in brackets in table 4) shows that the variability of the DR 
is rather low in most of the different types of procedure. 
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Table 4: Comparison of the dissenting ratios of the different groups of types of procedure  
 
 Germany Bulgaria Portugal 
Group a  
applicant's constitutional 
rights or competencies not 
affected / direct weakening 
of political opponents 
possible 
0.245 [7] 
(0.305) 
0.398 [2] 
(0.209) 
0.000 [19] 
(0.000) 
Group b 
applicant's constitutional 
rights or competencies not 
affected / direct weakening 
of political opponents 
impossible 
0.080 [47] 
(0.153) 
0.163 [284] 
(0.196) 
0.190 [59] 
(0.213) 
Group c 
applicant's constitutional 
rights or competencies 
affected / direct weakening 
of political opponents 
possible 
0.015 [202] 
(0.078) 
0.097 [13] 
(0.101) 
0.025 [169] 
(0.075) 
Group d 
applicant's constitutional 
rights or competencies 
affected / direct weakening 
of political opponents 
impossible 
0.0003 
[96,358] 
(0.008) 
0.075 [9] 
(0.114) 
0.018 [3,412] 
(0.075) 
Source: Authors' own compilation. Means of the four groups, number of cases per group 
[in square brackets], standard deviation (in brackets).  
 
In the case of the Portuguese Constitutional Tribunal, we also see a declining 
DR from group (b) to (c) and (d). However, group (a) differs from the other 
two countries and our theoretical assumptions. In this group, the overall 
dissenting ratio (and the ratio of every single decision in this group) is 
DR=0.0. Apart from this exception, though, the comparison of the means of 
the four groups in the three countries confirms a moderating influence of the 
types of procedure in accordance with our expectations. Since this pattern is 
by and large observable in all three cases with their broad differences in 
caseload, it can be interpreted as showing differences in the degree of 
politicization. 
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In the following, we look into the three cases and the different types of 
procedure separately. This detailed analysis offers additional information to 
our overall results. In the case of the German court, two types of procedure 
do not fit our theoretical assumptions (see figure 1). The forfeiture of basic 
rights (in group a) and the scrutiny of elections (group c) feature the lowest 
possible degree of politicization with a DR of 0.0. With regard to the former 
type of procedure, however, only one decision was taken in the period under 
investigation. The court rejected an application of the federal government 
against two extreme right-wing politicians unanimously with the plausible 
(and genuine judicial) argument, 
 
that prison sentences, to which both defendants were convicted in the 
context of their right-wing extremist activities, have been suspended after 
the application. After considering all circumstances, the criminal courts have 
predicted that the defendants will no longer militantly pursue their right-
wing extremist convictions.71 
 
Considering the singularity of this case, however, it cannot be interpreted  
as an empirical rebuttal of our hypotheses.   
                                                 
71 Bundesverfassungsgericht, 'Die Anträge der Bundesregierung, die Verwirkung von 
Grundrechten auszusprechen, sind nicht hinreichend begründet.' (Lexetius.com, 30 
July 1996) <http://www.lexetius.com/1996,517> accessed 19 May. See BVerfG 2 BvA 
1/92, 2 BvA 2/92. 
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Figure 1: Germany: Aggregated dissenting ratio per type of procedure 
 
 
Source: Authors' own collection. In brackets: number of decisions observed. 
 
All 97 scrutiny decisions of the German Federal Constitutional Court 
between 1991 and 2010 were also taken without any public dissent. This 
unexpected result can partly be explained by the rejection of many 
complaints against election results for an obvious formal reason: they were 
not supported by at least 100 registered voters, as was required by the Law on 
the Federal Constitutional Court (§ 48, para. 1) up until 2012.72 Still, it 
remains remarkable that among these 97 unanimous decisions a number of 
highly politically controversial cases can be found, such as the decisions on 
the negative voting weight, which forced the parliament to reform the 
election law,73 or the decision on the use of electronic voting machines.74 
 
In the case of the Bulgarian Constitutional Court, all types of procedure 
confirm our hypotheses without exception (see figure 2). The two party ban 
procedures during the period of investigation were highly politicized.  
The mean of DR=0.398 is the highest aggregated dissenting ratio of all types 
                                                 
72 Law on the Federal Constitutional Court (1951) as published on August 11, 1993 
<http://www.iuscomp.org/gla/statutes/BVerfGG.htm> accessed 17 June 2015. 
73 BVerfGE 121, 266. 
74 BVerfGE 123, 39. 
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of procedure in the three countries.75 In 1992, a minority of five against six 
judges refused a party ban application against the Movement for Rights and 
Liberties, a party which primarily represents the Turkish minority in Bulgaria. 
In 2000, the Constitutional Court banned the splinter party OMO Ilinden-
PIRIN, which represents the Macedonian minority in Bulgaria, with a 9-to-3 
vote. Both litigations were clearly politically motivated.76 
 
Figure 2: Bulgaria: Aggregated dissenting ratio per type of procedure  
 
 
Source: Authors' own collection. In brackets: number of procedures observed.  
 
With regard to the disputes between state bodies, it might be surprising that 
only two decisions were taken in this type of procedure during the whole 
period under investigation. In contrast, there were no less than 66 decisions 
in constitutional interpretation procedures. This can be explained by the 
high requirements for the former type of procedure. Therefore, applicants 
prefer – whenever it is possible – to ask for a general constitutional 
                                                 
75 However, in several cases of other types of procedure we have observed even higher 
non-aggregated dissenting ratios (see n 51). 
76 Decisions No. 4/1992 and 1/2000; see Daniel Smilov, 'Constitutionalism of Shallow 
Foundations: the Case of Bulgaria' in Denis J. Galligan and Mila Versteeg (eds), Social 
and Political Foundations of Constitutions (CUP 2013), 611, 631–633. 
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interpretation, although they de facto aim at resolving a concrete conflict.77 
Thus, these cases are often 'hidden' disputes between state bodies. 
 
Contrary to the German and Bulgarian cases, no party ban procedure took 
place before the Portuguese Constitutional Tribunal in the period under 
investigation (see figure 3). However, there were 19 decisions on appeals 
against the financial audit of political parties or election campaigns  
– the most frequent type of procedure in group (a) in all three countries. 
Against our expectations, all of these decisions were taken unanimously. Two 
arguments might explain these findings. First, contrary to all other group (a) 
types of procedure, no political opponents face each other as appellant and 
defendant before the court in this case. Instead, the affected political actor 
faces the constitutional court itself. Furthermore, the court is obligated to 
start the financial audit ex officio, before the negatively affected parties or 
candidates may raise objections. Thus, political strategies and interests of 
opposing parties as a reason for politicization are lacking to a large extent.  
                                                 
77 See Venelin I. Ganev, 'The Rise of Constitutional Adjudication in Bulgaria' in 
Wojciech Sadurski (ed), Constitutional Justice, East and West. Democratic 
Legitimacy and Constitutional Courts in Post-Communist Europe in a Comparative 
Perspective (Springer 2002), 247, 253. 
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Figure 3: Portugal: Aggregated dissenting ratio per type of procedure  
 
 
Source: Authors' own collection. In brackets: number of procedures observed. 
 
Second, the judges do not have to interpret fairly open constitutional norms. 
They rather have to review whether clear-cut provisions of the financing of 
the Political Parties Act has been observed. Unlike in the case of the party 
ban procedure, the judges' role is thus similar to the one of judges in ordinary 
courts, who have relatively little scope for interpretation. This second 
argument might also explain the fact that the Constitutional Tribunal took 
all decisions on appeals against elections or deliberations of the governing 
bodies of political parties (group [c]) unanimously, even if the number of 
observations is rather low (seven decisions).  
 
The other three types of procedure that appeared in the Portuguese case 
confirm our hypotheses. As outlined in the previous section, there is a special 
case of abstract review procedures: these proceedings could be initiated by 
the prosecution office or a constitutional judge when a legal norm was 
declared unconstitutional inter partes in at least three concrete reviews in 
order to achieve a general rejection of this particular norm. In the period 
under our investigation, 20 such proceedings took place. As mentioned 
above, we coded these cases as concrete reviews in a first step since they are 
based on concrete disputes. If we analyze the cases as a separate type of 
procedure, however, the dissenting ratio (DR=0.098) is clearly higher than in 
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the rest of the concrete reviews (DR=0.018/3,392 cases), but distinctly lower 
than for the abstract reviews (DR=0.190). This result reflects the fact that 
this type of procedure combines elements of concrete and abstract review. It 
also indicates the usefulness of dissenting opinions for analyzing 
politicization. 
 
When we compare the three cases on the level of the individual types of 
procedure, two more results stand out. First, in all three countries the 
abstract reviews (group [b]) are politicized to a much higher degree than all 
types of procedure of group (c), i.e. disputes between state bodies, scrutiny of 
elections, and appeals against elections or deliberations of the governing 
bodies of political parties. This result even persists if we include the Bulgarian 
constitutional interpretation procedure as 'hidden' disputes between state 
bodies into group (c). This confirms our assumption of a systematically 
stronger influence of the legal requirements hypothesis (H1) compared to the 
political opportunities hypothesis (H2). Second, we can confirm the 
prominent assumption outlined above that political motives and influences 
play a much stronger role in abstract than in concrete reviews. The dissenting 
ratios of abstract reviews are distinctly higher than those of concrete reviews 
in all three countries. 
 
3. Do the Types of Procedure Only Mirror the Claimants' Strategies and Interests? 
Before we conclude our results, we would like to discuss one obvious 
objection against our findings. One could argue that the different dissenting 
ratios for the types of procedure only mirror different strategies of the 
claimants. On the one hand, this effect could result from the fact that certain 
types of procedure can de jure only be initiated by certain claimants. 
Additionally, the appellants could de facto use the different types of procedure 
to a varying extent. Thus, our findings would only confirm the moderating 
effect of the types of procedure concerning the different strategies and 
interests of the parties involved. 
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Table 5: Ranking of dissenting ratios per type of procedure and appellant 
 
Country/Appellant Rank 1 Rank 2 Rank 3 Rank 4 
Germany     
Individuals/Organizations Dispute 
between 
state bodies 
0.0096 [13] 
Const. 
complaint 
0.0002 
[96,025] 
Scrutiny of 
elections 
0.0000 [55]  
Parliament 
Party ban 
0.5710 [1] 
Abstract 
review 
0.1406 [8] 
Dispute 
between 
state bodies 
0.079 [37]  
Federal Government 
Party ban 
0.2855 [2] 
Dispute 
between 
state bodies 
0.0000 [2] 
Forfeiture of 
basic rights 
0.0000 [1]  
State Government 
Party ban 
0.1903 [3] 
Abstract 
review 
0.0750 [35]  
Dispute 
between 
state bodies 
0.000 [10]  
Bulgaria     
Parliament 
Party ban 
0.398 [2]    
Abstract 
review 
0.191 [134] 
Const. 
Interpret. 
0.104 [37] 
Scrutiny of 
elections 
0.095 [8] 
Government 
Const. 
Interpret. 
0.079 [8] 
Abstract 
review 
0.000 [1]  
Dispute 
between 
state bodies 
0.000 [1]  
President Abstract 
review 
0.180 [15]    
Const. 
Interpret. 
0.108 [7]   
Courts Abstract 
review 
0.181 [11] 
Const. 
Interpret. 
0.111 [3] 
Concrete 
review 
0.075 [9]  
Prosecution Office Abstract 
review 
0.152 [49] 
Const. 
Interpret. 
0.135 [10] 
Scrutiny of 
elections 
0.114 [3]  
Portugal     
Individuals/Organizations/ 
Party members 
Scrutiny of 
elections 
0.025 [161] 
Concrete 
review 
0.013 [2,950] 
Financial 
audit of 
parties and 
campaigns 
0.000 [19] 
Appeals 
against 
elections in 
political 
parties 
0.000 [7] 
Municipalities Scrutiny of 
elections 
0.077 [1] 
Concrete 
review 
0.067 [9]   
Source: Authors' own collection. Comparison of the means. In square brackets: number 
of procedures observed. 
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However, we argue that the types of procedure also have a moderating effect 
on the politicization of the constitutional adjudication that equally affects all 
appellants. In order to prove this assumption, we control the influence of the 
appellants by analyzing the rank order of the degrees of politicization of each 
type of procedure for the different appellants. If these rank orders 
correspond with the rank orders of all appellants (see Figures 1-3), this would 
confirm a moderating effect of the types of procedure on the contents of the 
claims and the judges' work independent from the strategies and interests of 
the claimants. This additional test is possible for all groups of claimants that 
have access to (and actually used) at least two different types of procedure. 
This is in fact the case for eleven actors in the three countries during the 
period under our investigation. 
 
Even if the number of observations per claimant is rather low in a couple of 
cases, the results clearly confirm that the effect of the types of procedure is 
independent from the claimants (see table 5). In ten of the eleven cases, the 
rank order of the dissenting ratios corresponds exactly with the overall 
picture for the respective country. Only in the case of the Bulgarian 
government, it does not. Thus, our data do not only show that the claimants 
influence the degree of politicization of constitutional jurisdiction by their 
strategic use of certain types of procedure. They also demonstrate that the 
types of procedure modify the claims and the following court decisions for all 
appellants in the same way. 
 
VII. CONCLUSION AND OUTLOOK 
 
Constitutional adjudication can be politicized by manifold factors, such as 
direct impacts on judges by political actors, the appointment of judges, the 
strategies and interests of the parties involved in constitutional disputes, and 
the judges' and the courts' understanding of their roles. Against this 
background, we have conceptualized the types of procedure as a moderating 
variable 'channeling' those political influences. Indeed, our analysis has 
shown that the types of procedure have a substantial moderating effect on 
the politicization of constitutional court decisions. Although there have 
been manifold theoretical and methodological challenges in distinguishing 
between law and politics, and bearing in mind the preconditions and 
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restrictions outlined in section IV, our operationalization of politicization by 
means of the dissenting ratio, i.e. the share of publicly dissenting judges 
among all judges taking part in the decision, allows us to draw this conclusion. 
Thus, our theoretical hypotheses can largely be considered confirmed: the 
lower the legal requirements of a type of procedure are, and the more 
opportunities to attack political opponents a type of procedure provides, the 
higher is ceteris paribus the politicization of the respective judicial decision. 
Additionally, the absence of the legal requirement to assert a violation of, or 
a threat to, the claimant's constitutional rights or competencies has a 
stronger impact on politicization than the direct possibilities to weaken the 
political opponents. Thus, types of procedure such as the concrete review, 
the individual constitutional complaint, or the dispute between state bodies 
seem to be preferable to procedures like the abstract review, the 
constitutional interpretation, or the party ban when it comes to the 
legitimacy of constitutional courts. 
 
Since we used a Most Different Systems Design, it furthermore seems 
reasonable to expect similar politicization patterns at other concentrated 
constitutional courts in democratic states in Europe as well. The analysis of 
three very different courts from this universe of cases enabled us to prove our 
theoretical assumptions on a solid empirical basis. All the three cases show 
similar results. To test our findings in a broader setting, future research 
should integrate other world regions, other regime types and other periods. 
Additionally, qualitative case studies seem to be reasonable in order to 
analyze why four individual types of procedure do not confirm our 
hypotheses (i.e. the scrutiny of elections, and the forfeiture of basic rights in 
Germany; the appeals against elections and deliberations in political parties, 
and appeals against the financial audit of political parties or election 
campaigns in Portugal). 
 
More generally, future scholarship should look into the relations between the 
types of procedure and the other variables mentioned at the outset of this 
article, i.e. the reasons for politicization (independent variables)  
and the possible contextual factors (moderating variables). In our study, we 
have shown that the types of procedure have a moderating effect independently 
from the strategies and interests of the claimants. For at least two more 
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variables, such interaction effects can also be assumed: First, the types of 
procedure might reflect a certain pattern of legal norms litigated before the 
court, i.e. depending on the kinds of norms (e.g. rules, standards, or 
principles) and/or the various contents of those norms (e.g. the different legal 
fields regulated by constitutional provisions). This would mean that the 
degrees of politicization vary as a function of the norms or group of norms at 
hand, which appear systematically different in the different types of 
procedure. Second, the types of procedure might reflect differing degrees  
of publicity, which in turn might be co-determined by the appellants. For 
instance, types of procedure used by political appellants might have a higher 
publicity than concrete review procedures.78 Thus, for the analysis of the 
impact that types of procedures have on the politicization of constitutional 
court decisions this study is a first step only. 
 
                                                 
78 See for these factors, but with a different leading question, Ulrich Sieberer, 
'Strategische Zurückhaltung von Verfassungsgerichten. Gewaltenteilungs-
vorstellungen und die Grenzen der Justizialisierung' (2006) Zeitschrift für 
Politikwissenschaft 1299; Georg Vanberg, The Politics of Constitutional Review in 
Germany (CUP 2005). 
